Objections to the Moral Argument (Part 1): Why Mere Possibilities Aren’t Enough

Recently, we released an episode of the Truthful Hope Podcast in which Steve and I presented the moral argument for God's existence and addressed common objections (you can click here to watch the episode!). The teaser clip of the argument was posted on social media, presented in its logical form, and it received unexpected pushback. I would like to briefly address it here. 

The moral argument traditionally is framed like this: 

(1) If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist. 

(2) Objective moral values and duties exist.

(3) Therefore, God exists.[1]

In response, many in the comment section said things like, “This argument is unsound because it is possible that objective morality can be grounded somewhere other than God.” This is an objection to premise (1) of the argument. However, there is a major flaw in this line of thinking, and I thought it was important to share my thoughts here. 

For a logical deductive argument to be sound, the conjunction of the premises must be more plausible than not. If this is the case, then it is reasonable to believe in the conclusion. Many, unfortunately, think that “certainty” is required for an argument to be sound or a premise to be plausible. This is the root of the flawed thinking I have seen in the comment section. 

However, certainty is not a requirement for the plausibility of a premise. Rather, as J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig said,

“If the conjunction of the premises is more plausible than not, then the conclusion of a deductive argument is guaranteed to be more plausible than not.”[2]

So, when the skeptic comes across the moral argument for the existence of God and quickly points out mere possible alternatives to premise (1), they did not do the damage they intended. Actually, they shifted the burden of proof to themselves and must be prepared to provide reasons why anyone should believe their alternative is as plausible as, or more plausible than, the premise. 

To dismiss the validity of a logical argument, it is not merely enough to raise alternatives that are “epistemically possible” to the premises. Instead, one must present alternatives that are as plausible or more plausible than the premises.  Possibilities, like mere opinions, come cheap when it comes to whether a logical argument is sound or not.

For instance, let’s say I raise the following deductive logical argument about reality: 

(A) If our experiences exhibit persistence order, causal regularity, and intersubjective coherence, then they are grounded in an objective reality; 

(B) Our experiences do exhibit persistent order, causal regularity, and intersubjective coherence; 

(C) Therefore, our experiences are grounded in an objective reality. 

A skeptic may object by saying it is possible (epistemically) that we are living in a matrix right now, and in such a matrix, we can still exhibit persistent order, causal regularity, and intersubjective coherence, because it’s a certain kind of matrix that allows such things. 

I cannot know for certain that this special matrix proposal is incorrect. While it’s surely epistemically possible, it only has any significant impact on our argument and the validity of our premises if it’s as plausible or more plausible than premise (A) above.  In other words, sure, this special matrix may be possible, but can it plausibly explain persistent order, causal regularity, and intersubjective coherence as much or more than premise (A)? That’s the question—not mere possibility, but plausibility with explanatory power compared to what is being put forth in the argument. As Moreland and Craig wrote,

“The question is not whether the contradiction of a particular premise in an argument is epistemically possible (or even plausible); the question is whether the contradiction is as plausible or more plausible than the premise. If it is not, then one should believe the premise rather than its contradiction.”[3]

So, when skeptics in the comment section reject premise (1) of the moral argument because of mere alternative possibilities to ground objective morality, no progress has been made. To undermine the conclusion, one would have to do more than list possible alternatives. They must also argue for why it is at least as plausible as the premise. Despite the confidence the skeptical commenters have in their alternative "possible" explanations, none, upon further examination, are as plausible as, or more plausible than, God being the source of objective morality. 

As defenders of the moral argument for the existence of God, let us not give the skeptic an easy path out of wrestling with the argument by listing mere possible exceptions. That won't do. They must be prepared to do much more than that. They ought to defend such possible alternative explanations against the plausibility of our premises. If they cannot do so, then their "possible" alternative explanations, like mere opinions, come cheap.

Footnotes:

[1] William Lane Craig, On Guard: Defending Your Faith with Reason and Precision (Colorado Springs, CO: David C. Cook, 2010), 129.

[2] J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 2^nd edition, (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2017), 29.

[3] Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 30. (emphasis added)

Bibliography:

Craig, William Lane. On Guard: Defending Your Faith with Reason and Precision. Colorado Springs, CO: David C. Cook, 2010.

Moreland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. 2^nd Edition. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2017.